Disconnects

Shortly after Rumsfeld gave us the "You go to war with the Army you have" quote, some wag(I don't remember who), came up with "You go to war with the press you have", and they're both true. I have my doubts now that we can win any war, let alone in Iraq, with the current American news media. Part of that is the US military's fault, part if it can be laid on the media, and part goes to the news consumers themselves. What brings this to mind is that there is a big disconnect between my perspective on Iraq and the words and attitudes of what appears to be most other Americans now. Iraq is widely perceived as a failure and frankly, I don't see it that way.

When most people see a situation differently than I do, I think it's prudent to step back and see if my own biases and wishes are coloring my perspective. In this case, Iraq, I've stepped back and spent a fair amount of time the last few weeks closely reading about events there and I see many things to worry about, basically the same things we have been concerned with to one degree or another for 3 years now. I still don't see the complete failure or disaster that most Americans apparently see. So is that my wrong perspective or is something else at play here?

Michael Yon has an essay in the Weekly Standard excoriating the US military on it's handling of media embeds in Iraq. Yon has written extensive and, in my opinion, excellent essays and reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. He and other independent journalists are being blocked from embedding with units in Iraq, despite the invitation of unit commanders. Read the whole thing. It's possible that there's more to the story and that Yon is leaving something out that would explain the military's actions, but I doubt it. Yon has earned a lot of credibility with me with his past reporting. I would be shocked if he was less than forthcoming about something like that. This is a huge mistake on the military's part, as is the latest crackdown on milblogs. My perspective on Iraq is informed to a significant degree by independent journalists like Yon and by milbloggers. It is raw source data, unfiltered by the media, and it is largely no bullshit and pro mission in Iraq. The US military should encourage those avenues to the public, not discourage them. It should also more actively market and prepare for public consumption their own source documents. More on that in a second.

The various major news media outlets filter what we news consumers see from them and that is not a criticism in and of itself, it's a natural result of constraints on print space and broadcast time. For example, when US Army General Caldwell does a press briefing in Baghdad, I don't expect the Washington Post to print the whole transcript. I do expect to see a reasonably complete description of the event. Is that what I get though?

I wonder if a big part of the disconnect between my perspective and many American's perspective on Iraq is that in many cases, I have read both the source material and the news stories on them. How many people look for and find the transcript for a press briefing and then compare it to what was given to them by their favorite news outlet? How many people see what has been filtered out? Does it matter?

Let's look at General Caldwell's press briefing last Thursday in Baghdad. The transcript is here and I encourage you to take the time to read it. Much of the reporting on the briefing focused on the General's use of the word "disheartening" and painted a very pessimistic picture of events in Iraq and Baghdad in particular. General Caldwell forthrightly presented the current problems in Baghdad and did talk about the need to reassess the strategy to quell the violence there. It's sobering news and like the General said, disheartening. I would expect the media to report that and even highlight it.

The thing is though, if you read the transcript, General Caldwell also talks about the Iraqi security forces independently planning and successfully executing security for a pilgrimage of hundreds of thousands of Shi'a to Najaf, the third such event in as many months. He also noted some major Iraqi and Coalition actions against anti-government forces and the continued efforts to train and deploy Iraqi Security Forces. I didn't see that in any media report on the briefing nor this quote:

"A good number of weapons and caches are discovered by Iraqi security forces, and we attribute that to the fact they're normally knowledgeable in the area in which they're operating in, and their ever-improving professionalism and the skills which we see them displaying each and every day.  Iraqi security forces continue to grow in numbers and capabilities and in their independence."

A constant theme of General Caldwell throughout the briefing was how Iraqis actually are standing up and taking on the task at hand. A major story last week was the sectarian violence in Balad, Iraq. It was still news yesterday with this story in the Washington Post. I urge you to take the time to read both the Post's story and General Caldwell's description of events and his responses to the questions of the Post reporter at the briefing. There is a huge difference in how General Caldwell and the Post describe events. Essentially, General Caldwell says that Iraqis stepped up after the initial and retaliatory killings and managed to stop the violence from going further on their own, through both security forces and political meetings. The Post story paints a bleak picture of vacillation and weakness.

Here's how the Washington Post story, bylined by Ellen Knickmeyer, describes the response from the US military in the area:

By the end of Saturday, the U.S. forces had learned about the mass killings underway in Balad, Caldwell, the military spokesman, said in Baghdad. A platoon-size quick-reaction force was dispatched that same day, he said.

The U.S. soldiers asked the Balad officials whether they wanted help, Caldwell said, but the officials declined the offer. The Iraqi government made no request for assistance, he said.

Caldwell described Shiite officials in the town as seemingly interested only in receiving local intelligence from the Americans.

The U.S. military spokesman said he did not know whether U.S. forces intervened. By Sunday, American forces had received reports of at least 57 people slain.

Here's what Caldwell actually said last Thursday and it gets a bit long, but please bear with me:

Generally, the timeline of events as they occurred in Balad was such that what we think probably precipitated this was the fact that on the 12th, an Iraqi army force did in fact engage and kill an al Qaeda in Iraq leader element -- person out there, which we think then precipitated, late on the evening of the 12th, early the morning of the 13th, the murder of what now appears to be 14 Shi'a that were killed or murdered out in that location.  We do know that in retribution to that, we saw 23 -- or 26 Sunni killed the following day.  And again, these numbers correspond to the locations on the map where approximately these events occurred.  So the killing of the Shi'a members were up in this area here, and the Sunni down here.

As you know, the city is predominantly Shi'a and the surrounding area predominantly Sunni.   

We do know on the 15th that all the leadership came together and convened a meeting -- the very first one that they did, that they did on their own, to start addressing the very issues which brought on that sectarian violence.   

We know the following day there was some indirect fire that came into the town, which did kill one more Iraqi local national.  And then there was a very large, significant meeting of just -- I want to say anywhere -- I've heard the number's anywhere from 600 to a thousand people that attended on the 18th, in which they continued to further address and talk about the issues that were confronting them out in that location.   

When the incident occurred back here on the 13th, when it became known to us -- we, of course, are in support of the Iraqi security fores out there.  As you know, the 4th Iraqi Army is operating independently, directly under the control of the Iraqi ground forces command.  It does not take their command and control anymore from the coalition forces.   

We stand ready to assist as requested.  We in fact did hear about the incident that did occur on the 13th there.  We did dispatch, based on the reports that occurred, a quick reaction force into the city to link up with and assist the local Iraqi security forces that were present at that time and offer whatever additional assets we could, which include at that time both overhead assets and some other intelligence-collecting assets.  And we stayed ready to assist them and continue to help them.  We continued patrolling actively from that point on with them and assisting them as they requested from us.

Q     (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL:  Yes.

Q     (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL:  The QRF responded -- and the first QRF force went into the city on the 13th.  And again, this was not at the request of the Iraq security forces.

At that point, they still did not make a former request for any additional forces or assistance.  We did provide aerial overhead assets to give them some better vision about what was going on throughout the city and the surrounding area.  But otherwise, they were handling the situation themselves at that point.

Q     I'm a little bit confused about that, actually, because you're just saying that the forces there are autonomous and need to -- you know, need to make -- they need to make a formal request for your assistance.

GEN. CALDWELL:  That's correct.

Q     And yet you said that you dispatched the QRF to --

GEN. CALDWELL:  Yes, we heard that -- we had heard that there was -- we had heard through some different sources that something happened in the city, and so we went into the city to find the Iraqi security forces to see if there was any assistance we could provide.  We had received some reports of some Iraqis having been murdered, so we went into the city with our QRF, which stands ready to assist, to see if they needed any help or assistance.

Q     And how big was the QRF?

GEN. CALDWELL:  I have to get back you the exact size.  As I understand, not more than a platoon size, but I'll have to verify that for you.

Yeah, Ellen.

Q     Ellen Knickmeyer with The Washington Post.  When the QRF went in and talked to the Iraqi security forces and asked if they needed help, what did they say?  Did they ask for help then?  When did the American forces actually start doing something, if they did get involved, to try to stop the violence.  And also when did -- you said this far the dispatch of national police from Baghdad, when did that start coming in and how did they do as far -- in containing the violence, because local people say that the national police actually helped Shi'a militias in driving out the Sunni families.

GEN. CALDWELL:  Ellen, I have not drilled down into the individual unit tactics up there.  We would be glad to get that information for you.  We can in fact get that from the unit up there.    I don't have it quite down to that detail.  I was more focused on, one, did they ever in fact request our assistance?  No, they did not. Two, did we go into the city anyway after we heard reports that there was some killings going on?  We did, and we are there in offering any assistance we could have to them, which they only wanted was some better understanding what was out in the city, which we used by using our aerial assets overhead to provide them some information.

I'd have to get the details exactly what numbers remained in the city, but it was just the QRF that was responding to provide assistance at that point.

Q     So the QRF never actually did anything to kind of get physically involved in stopping whatever killing was going on already and tracking down Sunni families?

GEN. CALDWELL:  I'll have to go back and ask.  I did not talk specifically to the QRF commander.  I talked to the battalion commander just a little while ago.  But I'd have to go back and ask some more particulars.  But we'll be glad to get that for you -- those specifics.

Q     Okay.

GEN. CALDWELL:  But again, I think that one thing to understand, this was an Iraqi-led effort.  I think what's probably most notable, and I think people shouldn't overlook the fact is the fact that you've got the leadership up there in (Salahuddin ?) and in Balad coming together on the 15th, realizing that they wanted to take control and regain, you know, leadership inside their city and outside their city, and that's in fact what they did.

They brought all kinds of different elements together, both Sunni and Shi'a.  They brought in the -- from the provincial governor to the deputy governor down to the city council members, they brought in some sheikhs from the local area.  I mean it was a fairly good crowd there that got together on the 15th somewhere -- I don't know the exact number, but I know there was at least 30 or 40 people that immediately came together, which said we're going to stop the sectarian violence, we're not going to allow this cycle to start up up here in this area. And they, in fact, have been able to that very thing, which I think is extremely commendable on the part of watching the leadership in the local area take control of the situation, which is exactly what you would hope and want to see happen up there.  And then they had a much larger conference just here on the 18th, which involved hundreds of people coming together and pledging their commitment that they will not allow sectarian violence to start up in that area, and that they're going to work together and they're going to form committees and they're going to have a dialogue to preclude this from happening again.   

Yes, ma'am?

Q     Nancy Youssef from McClatchy Newspapers.  Is this experience in Balad, the fact that the Quick Reaction Force had to come out not because they were requested, but because they saw what was happening, and the subsequent events, is that all a further sign that perhaps the Iraqi forces can't stop sectarian violence that could quickly fuel what some are calling an emergence of war?  That is, are communities being handed over to the Iraqi forces too quickly?

GEN. CALDWELL:  No, I would not say that at all.  In fact, the Quick Reaction Force was not aware of anything specifically, it only received anecdotal reporting.  And so in an effort to go ahead and immediately see if we can provide any assistance, went into the city to see if there was something in fact going on that they could provide assistance with.  Again, this was an Iraqi-led operation.  They're the ones who ultimately brought the situation under control.  They're the ones who helped facilitate all these meetings between all the various groups, from very senior people from the governor all the way down to sheikhs in the area, to the city council and everybody else.  It was not done by coalition forces.  This was totally an Iraqi-led and executed operation.   

You are going to have incidents of violence occur.  The question is, how does somebody respond to it, and how quickly can they quell it    and bring it back under control.  And in fact, here they proved that they had the ability, even though we had a tit-for-tat all occur in about a 36-hour period, to start bringing the situation back under control.   

And we have not seen that cycle repeat itself at this point.   

Q     (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL:  Yes.

Q     But to sort of continue on Ellen's point, residents there on both sides would argue that had it not been for the presence of the coalition forces, it could have escalated even further.  (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL:  I'd have to go back and ask the ground force commander himself if he really feels that was the case.  I have not asked him.  But that was not the impression I got.

We went in just to help provide assistance.  We weren't the ones in any kind of large preponderance of force that taking charge of the situation.  It was the Iraqis -- it was the Iraqi police, with the national police and the Iraqi army, that in fact take charge of the situation up there.

Hmmm. A bit of a discrepancy there it seems to me, though if you disagree I'd like to hear why.

News media outlets are under considerable fire right now and accused of bias. There may very well be a bias behind how events are reported but it seems a fool's game to me to try to divine the motivations of reporters or editors. We are all better served by simply pointing out the objective flaws in the product that they are delivering. Ten or twenty years ago most of us had no access at all to the original sources of information that were reported to us. We got whatever the particular outlet we read gave us. The options are different now and we can access original sources and come to our own conclusions about what are pertinent facts and what are not. 

While the same applies generally to a lot of organizations, the US Military in particular would be better served if they marketed and encouraged more independent reporting, be they journalists or bloggers. Take the money from "Army Strong" and just work on getting the General Caldwells and the news from the boots on the ground out to people unfiltered. It's not all good news and sometimes it's embarrassing. So be it, that's how we learn and get better.

We, the news consumers, also need to step up and do our part. We need to hold the media to account for the accuracy of the product they give us. That takes time and effort and a bit of skepticism as to what we get on a daily basis. It's so much easier to get our news spoonfed, I know. But we should demand access to source documents more and more and discredit those news media that don't provide them. Even if we don't have the time to look at it all, some very talented and fair people do. Read what those people have to say and encourage others to do the same. Fair and responsible criticism will only make the many good and decent journalists out there better.