MSNBC posted the Taguba Report a few days ago. I hadn't had time to read it in it's entirety until today and a depressing read it is. Like all formal military reports it's loaded with jargon and acronyms. If you need a hand deciphering that stuff I found an old post at The Command Post that led me here.
Maj. Gen. Taguba makes it pretty clear that there were problems in the 800th MP Brigade and warning signs that go back to May 2003. It's a long report, and if you haven't been in the military it may be pretty difficult to follow or get the point. But I would encourage you to read the whole thing. If any story needs context it's this one. Also note that towards the end he compliments other units within the 800th MP Brigade.
There's no doubt that the officers cited, as well as the enlisted troops, are in for a very difficult time. The evidence seems overwhelming. I also think that the investigation needs to go up one more level and it will be interesting to see how that is handled going forward. Taguba slams Brigadier General Karpinski and much of her staff pretty hard, and has the evidence to back it up. Somebody should have been supervising her and that person or persons probably deserve a reprimand. I don't think that would be Sanchez but one of his staff. I could be wrong though. I'll have to do a little digging there. Just one point for today though, on rising up to challenges.
"The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
Taguba notes that this all started when the 800th was reassigned to do detainee work in May 2003. There were two problems with this: They weren't trained for it and they had thought they were going back home. Start there, and add this finding:
"17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)".
Ok, so we have 8 Battalions reporting to a screwed up Brigade Command staff. These were Reservists, so the Regular Army people probably didn't realize how screwed up they were at first. Add the fact that they were reassigned to duty they were not properly trained for (and they were understrength) and you can see where this could head. Much will be made of lack of training and being understrength to defend these officers. The press will love it because it will then be a way to stick it to the "system" and who runs the system? Why that would be Rumsfeld. And who does Rumsfeld report to? Why that would be the President. It's his fault.
Bullshit and here's why. Towards the end of this report, Taguba specifically commends other Battalions of the 800th MP Brigade:
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.
a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to understand their basic tasks.
b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.
c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve discipline throughout the FOB.
Those individuals and units rose above the difficulties and did their mission. This is the Army folks, not some union job. You do what you need to do to accomplish the mission. If that's not what you were trained to do, you find the field manuals and you figure it out. Any officer or NCO worth a damn digs in, gets their shit together and moves on. The officers cited directly above did that.
The officers reprimanded did not and they probably were not competent to begin with. They survived and prospered because the level of command below them had enough training in their mission to cover that fact. When the mission changed not all of the Battalions below were able to cover for them anymore. The report makes clear that much of the leadership of the 800th failed to execute their duties. Try as they might to blame the situation on other factors, it was their job to rise to the challenges and accomplish the mission.
This sort of thing happens in the civilian world all the time. How many managers in business survive because the people under them get the job done? A lot. In the Army this happens too. It is after all an organization of humans and thus not perfect. I would guess the frequency is higher in Reserve units than Regular Army, where the scrutiny is probably more disciplined. That was my perception from 20 years ago in the USAR. Much has changed since then though, with the Reserve and Guard units more integral to fighting a war now. The consequences for failing to carry out your duties are obviously different in the civilian world than in the military. One you get fired, the other potentially court-martialed. That comes with the territory. When you accept a Command you accept all the duties that go along with that.
Taguba lists item after damning item of no evidence that the Brigade Command asked for help or worked to learn from incidents and train their troops. Just looking at this report the officers charged are going to have a tough time defending themselves in a military court. Using the officers to explain away their actions won't work for the enlisted folks either. As Taguba notes, there were plenty of enlisted personnel who rose above the challenges also.
(Update...In re-reading this post I realized I forgot a point I was going to make. If you look at the Part Two Findings under section 34, a number of incidents (21) are noted. It's no coincidence that the ones involving the 320th MP Battalion mostly have "No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team." at the end. The few incidents that were investigated were investigated by a different Brigade. Note how the other incidents were investigated and the findings produced. This shows to some degree that in Battalions other than the 320th, incidents were investigated and the effort made to learn and improve.)
I think the story of those Battalions that overcame their challenges would be a very interesting, probably inspirational read. I was disappointed that the report didn't have more details. Maybe they are in the annexes that the link did not have in detail. The pessimist in me thinks we won't see much of that. That would spoil the fun for the press and Congress and they have not yet begun to pontificate. That would make it seem that the system can work (not perfectly mind you) and we can't have that can we?
There's a lot more than this to talk about and there will be more details coming out. That's for another post though. This one is long enough.
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